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Abstract
Using a unique micro panel data set we investigate whether active
labor market programs improve employment prospects and increase
mobility in the longer run. We consider two prototype programs: job
creation programs and training programs. We ﬁnd that both pro-
grams reduce the chances of ﬁnding a job substantially. Moreover,
both programs are associated with a locking-in eﬀect: the probability
of ﬁnding a job outside the home region decreases after program par-
ticipation. However, this eﬀect appears to stem exclusively from the
decrease in the overall job ﬁnding rate.
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Active labor market programs (ALMPs) have become an integral part of
the standard tool kit for combating unemployment in the OECD countries.
According to OECD (2001), the OECD countries allocate around 40 percent
of total labor market expenditures to active measures on average.
Although appropriately designed ALMPs should be a useful tool in ﬁght-
ing unemployment, the empirical evidence on the eﬃcacy of ALMPs is far
from conclusive; see e.g. Calmfors et al. (2002). There are several reasons for
t h ea p p a r e n tf a i l u r eo fA L M P st og e n e r a t ep o s i t i v ee m p l o y m e n te ﬀects; to
mention but a few in the comprehensive list of Calmfors (1994), ALMPs are
usually associated with displacement and “locking-in” eﬀects. A locking-in
eﬀect is said to exist if participation in ALMPs reduces the time available for
search or if ALMPs decreases the incentives to change occupation or region
of residence.1
In this paper we examine whether ALMPs are associated with locking-
in eﬀects. We have access to unique micro data where we can diﬀerentiate
between outﬂows to employment in the home region and outﬂows to employ-
ment in other regions; for a description of the data see Edin and Fredriksson
(2000). Hence, we can ask whether participation in programs aﬀects the job
ﬁnding probability in the home region as well as in other regions.
Previous research has documented a direct locking-in eﬀect in the sense
that search activity is lower among program participants than the openly
unemployed; e.g. Edin and Holmlund (1991) and van Ours (2002). However,
the received literature has little to say about potential locking-in eﬀects after
program completion. One strand of the literature studies the relationship
between migration rates and program activity across local labor markets;
e.g. Westerlund (1998) and Fredriksson (1999). The general result is that,
if anything, higher program activity reduces migration. Another approach is
to examine whether the individual mobility decision is aﬀected by program
activity in the region of residence; according to Widerstedt (1998) there is
no signiﬁcant relationship between the individual out-migration propensity
and program activity.
Our data are much richer than the data sets commonly employed to
study the relationship between employment, mobility and ALMPs. We know
whether an individual has participated in a program or not. Therefore, we
1Notice that we take no stance on whether the locking-in eﬀect good or bad for eﬃciency.
Eﬃciency may be reduced if it exacerbates the misallocation of labor. If there is too much
(or wasteful) mobility, a locking-in eﬀect may be beneﬁcial. Notice, though, that if there
is wasteful mobility, then the reduction of mobility can be achieved at less cost by raising
unemployment beneﬁts; see Diamond (1981) on the last point.
1can estimate individual treatment eﬀects of program participation rather
than using the correlation between migration rates and regional program ac-
tivity. We distinguish between two types of programs: job creation programs
and training programs. Job-creation programs are essentially measures that
provide temporary employment in the home region. Training programs, on
the other hand, oﬀer re-training and, presumably, individuals acquire qualiﬁ-
cations that are in general demand on the labor market. Therefore, it seems
reasonable to expect that locking-in eﬀe c t sm a yb eam o r es e r i o u sp r o b l e m
for job creation programs.
Our results can brieﬂyb es u m m a r i z e da sf o l l o w s .B o t hp r o g r a m sr e d u c e
the outﬂow to employment. Similarly, program participation implies that
contracted mobility declines. Relatively speaking, these eﬀects are quite
substantial in the longer run. We do not ﬁnd much evidence suggesting that
t h et y p eo fp r o g r a mi si m p o r t a n t .
The remainder of the paper is outlined as follows. The next section
sketches a simple analytical framework that we use as a guide for speciﬁca-
tion and interpretation. Section 3 discusses empirical and econometric issues
confronting the evaluation. Section 4 describes the data. In section 5, we
report the results. Section 6 concludes.
2A n a n a l y t i c a l f r a m e w o r k
This section describes the job search problem for heterogeneous individuals
who are non-employed. We characterize the self-selection into labor market
programs and use the model as a guide for the empirical analysis.
2.1 General set-up
Non-employed individuals can be in two states: (open) unemployment and
labor market programs, indexed by j =0 ,1 respectively. They search in two
regions — at (h)ome and (a)broad, indexed by i = h,a. Participation in labor
market programs (j =1 ) is assumed to aﬀect the job-ﬁnding probability in
two ways relative to open unemployment (j =0 ). First, it shifts the overall
probability of ﬁnding a job. Second, it shifts the relative eﬃciency of search
in the home region. We think it is plausible that participation in programs
shifts the relative search eﬃciency in favor of the home region; after all,
program participation generally means more contacts with local employment
oﬃcers and they specialize in job placements locally (at least to some extent).
Non-employed individuals choose search intensity in the two regions op-
timally. The rates at which jobs are located depend on the state and the
2number of units of search allocated to a particular region. A permanent
move takes place if they locate a job outside the home region; thus, there is
only contracted mobility. The job is kept until individuals “die” and perma-
nently exit the labor market. The event of death happens at rate δ, and in
such case they receive zero utility. Under these conditions, and assuming no
discounting, risk neutrality, as well as inﬁnite horizons, we can write the ex-
pected present value associated with ﬁnding a job at home as: V w
h =( wh/δ),
and the expected present value of ﬁnding a job abroad as V w
a =( wa/δ)−m.2
The mobility cost (m)d i ﬀers across individuals and is distributed according
to F(m), deﬁned on the support m ∈ (0,m). The value of employment as
such (wi/δ) does not depend on whether the individual has entered from
unemployment or programs, or whether the individual had to move in order
to get it.3
Let us describe the environment more precisely by writing down the asset
values associated with open unemployment (V 0) and program participation
(V 1). We measure search in eﬃciency units and let e
j
i denote the eﬀort
needed to produce s
j
i eﬃciency units of search. Eﬀort is (strictly) increasing
and convex in the eﬃciency units of search
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i, where b denotes
unemployment income and utility is decreasing in eﬀort. The eﬀort functions
depend on the state, which captures the fact that programs may shift the
relative eﬃciency of searching at home. Job oﬀers arrive at rate αjs
j
i and in
that event the job searcher enjoys a gain of (V w
i −V j) in present value terms.
The overall job ﬁnding rate may diﬀer by state as indicated by αj.O ﬀers
to participate in programs arrive at rate γ. Having received an oﬀer the
2We impose a single regional wage rather than a regional wage oﬀer distribution. This
simpliﬁcation is without loss since search intensity and reservation wages usually do the
same job in the partial equilibrium search model.
3Although we do not model wage setting explicitly, these assumptions can be ratio-
nalized in a wage bargaining set-up if: programs do not aﬀect labor productivity, there
is continuous renegotiations, and the disagreement point is always the state of unemploy-
ment (or “death”). Note that, with continuous bargaining, any mobility costs incurred
are sunk. The assumption that labor market programs do not aﬀect productivity is of
course a simpliﬁcation, but we want to avoid this complication since we will only examine
employment and migration in our empirical work.
3unemployed decides on whether to participate or not; there are no sanctions
imposed on those who reject the oﬀer.
Individuals choose search intensity in each state by maximizing V j.T h e












for i = h,a and j =0 ,1. To avoid corner solutions to the search problem
we assume that (wa/δ − m − V j(m)) > 0, implying that all individuals
w i l ls e a r c ha th o m ea sw e l la sa b r o a d .T o t a ls e a r c ha sw e l la ss e a r c ha l o n g
each speciﬁc channel of course depends on m. In particular, search at home
increases and search abroad decreases with m. To see this, note that (1) and
(2) implies ∂V j/∂m ∈ (−1,0). Thus the marginal return to search at home
(αj(V w
h −V j))i si n c r e a s i n gi nm, while the marginal return to search abroad
is decreasing in m.
2.2 Self-selection into programs
As can be seen from equation (1) there will be some individuals who accepts
and some who rejects an oﬀer to participate in a program; thus self-selection
into the program is an issue. Here we characterize self-selection into pro-
grams. In order to simplify the exposition, we make some assumptions about,




















where κ is the extent of “home bias” associated with participating in active
labor market programs. If κ>0, it is less costly in terms of eﬀort to produce
a given amount of search intensity when searching in the home market. Given





















Moreover, we let the job arrival rate in programs be proportional to the job




Invoking (4) and (7), the program is completely characterized by two para-
meters: κ and η.I f κ = η =0 , programs and unemployment are identical
states.
4Now, let us characterize the self-selection into programs. Deﬁne the indi-
vidual with moving cost b m as the individual who is just indiﬀerent between
the program and open unemployment, i.e., b m is deﬁned by V 1(b m)=V 0(b m).










If this is positive, it means that V 1(m) ≥ V 0(m) for m ≥ b m, that is, those
with comparatively high moving costs will enter the program; if Ω(b m) < 0,
then V 1(m) <V0(m) for m ≥ b m. The derivative of the value of unemploy-
ment with respect to the mobility cost for an individual who do not accept





















According to (9) and (10) the crucial aspect is whether the program increases
or reduces the job-ﬁnding rate abroad relative to open unemployment. Some
manipulations of (8) using (5), (6), (9)-(10), V 1(b m)=V 0(b m),a n d( 7 )y i e l d













In general the sign of Ω(b m) is ambiguous, depending inter alia on the sign
of η and κ. We summarize three distinct cases in the following proposition.4
Proposition 1 Case (i):If η ≤ 0 and κ>0, those with m ≥ b m will opt for
the program. Case (ii):If η>0 and κ ≤ 0,t h o s ew i t hm<b m will opt for
the program. Case (iii):If η = κ =0 , there is no selection into programs.
The interpretation of these conditions is straightforward. Case (iii)i s
trivial: if η = κ =0 , there is no diﬀerence between participating in a labor
market program and being openly unemployed; hence there will be no self-
selection into programs. If η =0 , the type of selection is solely determined by
the sign of κ.I ft h e r ei sah o m eb i a s ,κ>0, then those with higher moving
4These cases do not exhaust all possibilities. It is readily veriﬁed that κ,η > 0,b u t
κ/(1 − κ) >η (2 + η) implies Ω(b m) > 0.
5costs will choose the program since for given search eﬀort they will ﬁnd a job
more easily in the home region. If κ =0 ,t h es i g no fη determines the type
of selection. If η>0, those with comparatively low moving costs enter the
program since the probability that they will pay the moving cost increases
along with the improvement of general employment prospects. Cases (i)a n d
(ii) are the interesting ones that we will consider in more detail in what
follows.
2.3 Evaluation parameters
For purposes of evaluating labor market programs, we are interested in the
outﬂow to employment at home and to employment in other regions than the
home region. The framework outlined above implies a variable coeﬃcients
framework, i.e. the response to treatment will vary with m. In the empirical
analysis we will focus on estimating a variant of treatment on the treated.5 In
this setting, treatment on the treated (TT i,i= h,a) for those participating










In principle we need two observations for each individual to calculate (12).
The classical problem is, of course, that we cannot observe s1
i(m) and s0
i(m)
a tt h es a m et i m ef o re a c hi n d i v i d u a l .
What we can readily observe in the data is the average outﬂow of in-
dividuals who have participated in the program and those who have not.
Let ∆i denote the diﬀerence in the average outﬂow. Then the simple diﬀer-





proposition gives the sign of the bias of ∆i for estimating TT i (Bi).6
Proposition 2 Case (i):Bh > 0 and Ba < 0.C a s e (ii):Bh < 0 and
Ba > 0.














5Since this is a variable coeﬃcients framework the average treatment eﬀect (ATE)
will diﬀer from treatment on the treated (TT). It is fairly straightforward to verify that
ATE > TT independently of the type of selection into the program.
6It may also be of interest to examine the bias of the naive estimator of the overall
outﬂow to employment. If aggregate search intensity (s0
h + s0
a)i sd e c r e a s i n gi nm then
this bias has the same sign as Ba. Aggregate search intensity will be decreasing in m if
s0
h ≥ s0
a which holds if wh ≥ (wa − δm).
6In case (i) D =1if m ∈ (b m,m).S i n c e∂s
j
h/∂m > 0 and ∂sj
a/∂m < 0 (for all
m) the term in square brackets is positive when considering the outﬂow to
employment in the home region and negative when considering the outﬂow
to employment outside the home region. In case (ii) D =1if m ∈ (0, b m)
and the opposite holds.
It is not obvious how to deﬁne the locking-in eﬀect. One candidate is just
to compare the employment hazard to other regions than the home region,
e.g., to calculate TT a as deﬁned in (12). Another alternative is to deﬁne the



















a(m)). This measure of the locking-in eﬀect
thus amounts to comparing search allocation across the two states for each







a(m)dF(m)? The following proposition gives the
result
Proposition 3 Case (i):B0
a < 0.C a s e(ii):B0
a > 0.































(for all m) the bias is negative. In case (ii) D =1if m ∈ (0, b m) and the
opposite holds.
Thus, the bias for the candidate evaluation parameter is equal in sign as
the one we considered earlier. In the empirical application we will consider
both evaluation parameters. If the results diﬀer depending on whether we
consider, e.g., TT a or TT0
a it may say something about what the program
does to treated individuals. In particular, the direct inﬂuence of the overall
job ﬁnding rate is eliminated when considering search allocation so TT0
a will
reﬂect the potential for home bias associated with program participation.
3 Empirical and econometric issues
The evaluation problem considered in this paper has at least three facets; by
and large they stem from the fact that we have to rely on observational data
7to examine the issues at hand. First, as high-lighted by the previous section,
there is the problem of self-selection. Second, there may be duration depen-
dence such that elapsed duration before entering the program will aﬀect the
chances of ﬁnding a job. Third, programs may start at any point in time
during the unemployment spell. The solution to the ﬁrst problem requires a
conditional (or mean) independence assumption. The complications arising
from duration dependence requires some care but has a fairly straightforward
solution. The third problem puts restrictions on what we can consistently es-
timate. In a companion paper (see Fredriksson and Johansson, 2003) we have
discussed the third issue at length. In what follows we discuss these three
problems in isolation; the ﬁnal subsection outlines our estimation approach.
3.1 Conditional independence and matching
Our model suggests that it is diﬃcult to come up with an instrument that
inﬂuences the selection into programs but does not aﬀect search. The reason
is that search intensity is proportional to (V w
i − V j)a n dt h es e l e c t i o ni n t o
programs is determined by a comparison of V 1 and V 0. So, anything that
inﬂuences search intensity will in general also determine the selection into
programs. Instead we rely on the argument that we can observe and, hence,
condition on many factors inﬂuenced by unobserved heterogeneity. So in
terms of the model we eﬀectively make a selection on observables assump-
tion, i.e., we assume that we can write the mobility cost as m = m(x).S i n c e
we have an unusually rich data set containing indicators of previous mobil-
ity, unemployment and income histories, household composition etc. this is
potentially a viable strategy. The conditioning on observed covariates can be
done via (the equivalent of) regression or matching (see e.g. Rosenbaum and
Rubin, 1983; Rosenbaum, 1995; Heckman et al., 1998; Dehejia and Wahba,
1999). In this paper we will take a matching approach.
T h ef a c tt h a tw eh a v em u l t i p l et r e a t m e n t s( j o bc r e a t i o np r o g r a m sa n d
training programs) makes the matching problem slightly non-standard. Here
we will discuss the conditional (or mean) independence assumption required
for matching in this setting. We make two simplifying assumptions for ex-
positional convenience. First, we assume that there is only one outcome:
unemployment duration (T). Second, we assume that the program starts at
a ﬁxed point in time. We will relax the second assumption later.
Let us introduce some notation. The treatment states are denoted as
follows: 0 denotes open unemployment; 1 participation in a job creation
program; and 2 participation in a training program. Deﬁne the potential
unemployment duration associated with each of the three states as T0, T1,
and T2,w i t hTik denoting the outcome for individual i if i were to receive
8treatment k. Further, let D = {0,1,2} denote the actual treatment, so that
Di = k if individual i receives treatment k. Since each individual receives only
one of the treatments, the remaining two potential outcomes are unobserved
counterfactuals.
In the evaluation we are interested in the pair-wise comparisons of the
average eﬀect of treatment k relative to treatment k0 conditional on assign-
ment to treatment k, for all three combinations of k and k0.G i v e nt h a tt h e
program starts at a ﬁxed point in time, the object of evaluation is
E(Tk − Tk0|D = k)=E(Tk|D = k) − E(Tk0|D = k),k , k
0 =0 ,1,2 (14)
In our application this is, for instance, the average eﬀect of participating
in a training program (k =2 ) for an individual registering as unemployed
compared to the hypothetical state in which (s)he stays openly unemployed
(k0 =0 )or participates in job creation (k0 =1 ) .T h eﬁrst term, the average
duration following treatment k for individuals who have participated in k,i s
observed (if there is no censoring). This is not the case for the counterfac-
tual E(Tk0|D = k), i.e., the expected duration participants in k would have
experienced had they taken k0 is not observed. Hence, we need to invoke
identifying assumptions to overcome this fundamental missing data problem.
Since we are interested in pair-wise comparisons, we require conditional
independence for the sub-populations receiving either treatment k or treat-
ment k0. One such identifying assumption (see Imbens, 2000) is that, condi-
tional on X,T k and Tk0 are statistically independent of the assignment:7
(Tk0,T k) ⊥ ⊥ D|X = x,∀x ∈ Ξ D ∈ (k,k
0) (15)






if D = k
otherwise
the independence assumption (15) implies that the unobserved counterfac-
tuals can be identiﬁed as
E(Tk0|D = k)=EX[E(Tk0|Dk =1 ,x)|Dk =1 ]=EX[E(T|Dk0 =1 ,x)|Dk =1 ]
Here the inner expectation is identiﬁed using the independence assumption
and the outer expectation is taken with respect to the distribution of X
for the participants in treatment k. The outer expectation highlights that
t h e r em u s tb es u ﬃcient overlap in the distribution of X in order to adjust for
7Imbens (2000) refers to this type of identifying assumption as weak unconfoundedness.
9diﬀerences in x among the participants in k and k0. If there are regions where
t h es u p p o r to fx does not overlap, matching has to be performed over the
common support; the estimated treatment eﬀect is then the mean treatment
eﬀect for those treated within the common support.8
The independence assumption (15) is stated in terms of a potentially large
set of covariates (x). An important practical result, derived by Rosenbaum
and Rubin (1983) for the single treatment case, is that it is suﬃcient to
condition on a scalar function of the covariates — the propensity score — to
adjust for diﬀerences in observed characteristics. This result generalizes to
the case of several treatments. Let
ekk0(x)=P r ( Dk =1 |x,D k =1∨ Dk0 =1 )
be the conditional probability to enter k given a choice between k and k0.
Then the scalar ekk0(x) is a “balancing score” for the separate comparison
of the two sub-populations. Under the independence assumption (15), the
counterfactual can be estimated as
E(Tk0|Dk =1 )=E(E(T|Dk0 =1 ,e kk0(x))|Dk =1 ) ,
where E is the expectation with respect to ekk0(x). Thus by controlling
for systematic diﬀerences between the two sub-populations based on ekk0(x),
the average outcome experienced by the matched pool of participants in k0
identiﬁes the average counterfactual outcome for participants in k had they
participated in k0 instead
3.2 Duration dependence
Suppose now that there is duration dependence. Continue to assume that
the program starts a speciﬁct i m ep o i n tt, but suppose that there is some
variation in the date of unemployment entry (t0i). For illustrative purposes,
assume that this is the only form of heterogeneity, such that we can suppress
the covariates (x), and that there is only one prototypical program.
The fact that there is variation in the date of unemployment entry implies
that the duration prior to program start (ts) will vary over individuals since
ts
i = t−t0i. The question then is: What is a valid control group for a treated
individual with prior duration ts
i, given that there is duration dependence?
Since the outﬂow to jobs will be diﬀerent for individuals with durations
less than ts
i for reasons unrelated to the program as well as heterogeneity,
8Notice that if the treatment eﬀect varies among individuals, restricting the inter-
pretation to the common subset may change the interpretation of the parameter being
estimated.
10it is clear that one should remove these individuals from the control group.
Moreover, one would generally like to condition on the date of unemployment
e n t r ya st h es t a t eo ft h ec y c l ea tt h i sp o i n tm a yh a v ei m p l i c a t i o n sf o rf u t u r e
outcomes. Thus the comparison sample for individual i with prior duration
ts
i consists of those unemployed individuals with the same date of registration
as i and unemployment duration (T)s a t i s f y i n gT>t s
i. All that this means
is that the control group should consist of individuals who were at risk of
starting the program at t. Thus it is fairly straightforward to take care of
the complications arising from duration dependence.
Typically we are interested in the diﬀerence in the hazard to employment
between the treated and the controls after the start of the program. But
the treatment eﬀect potentially varies by duration prior to program start if
there is duration dependence. Therefore, to construct an average eﬀect we
calculate weighted averages of these treatment eﬀect using the distribution
of prior durations for the treated as weights.
3.3 Random program starts
The assumption that the program starts at a ﬁxed time point is clearly
unrealistic in most situations. In most cases, the timing of a program start
is best thought of as the outcome of a stochastic process involving inter alia
t h ea r r i v a lr a t eo fj o bo ﬀers and program participation oﬀers.
In the case of only one treatment, one would in general like to estimate,
e.g., treatment on the treated
E(T1|D =1 )− E(T0|D =1 ) (16)
This is simply the one-dimensional analogue of (14). Note that D = D(ts),
where the duration prior to program start (ts)i ss t o c h a s t i ce v e ni fw ec o n s i d e r
only individuals with the same date of unemployment entry.
To estimate (16) one is tempted to deﬁne a control group that was never
treated for each treated individual. But ﬁnding this control group involves
conditioning on the future since programs may start at any point in time.
Deﬁning the control group in this way implies conditioning on the outcome
variable as those who do not enter the program in the future to a large extent
consist of those who had the luck of ﬁnding a job. Thus the CIA required
for estimating (16) will not be valid.
The above observation suggests that the object of evaluation has to be
more modest. Without additional assumptions it is only possible to estimate
a treatment on the treated for those treated up to a certain time point, ¯ t,i . e .
E(T1(t)|D(t)=1 )− E(T0(t)|D(¯ t)=1 ) (17)
11where T1(t) is the potential unemployment duration if treated at t and T0(t)
is the potential duration of unemployment if not treated at t. The implied
deﬁnition of the control group is one that includes individuals who may take
part in the program in the future. As such it may be diﬃcult to interpret this
estimand. But notice that it is a relevant policy parameter in the environment
we are considering. It answers the question: What is the average eﬀect of
treating an individual at ¯ t relative to not doing so? Choosing the alternative
—i . e .n ot r e a t m e n ta t¯ t — does not rule out future treatment since the program
continuous to operate.
3.4 Estimation
Now we have set the stage for describing our estimation approach. We are
interested in the hazards to employment in the home region and employment
outside the home region. We treat these states as absorbing in a competing
risks framework.
In the previous sub-section we discussed the evaluation parameters in the
terms of the diﬀerence in unemployment duration. For our purposes it is






where Sj(t)=e x p ( −
R t
0 λ
j(τ)dτ) is the potential survival function if treated
with j =0 ,1,a n dλ
j(t), the hazard to employment, is analogously deﬁned. In
other words the survival function integrates to mean unemployment duration.
If the data contained completed spells we can thus estimate




[S1(t|D(t)=1 )− S0(t|D(t)=1 ) ]dt
¾
Here S1(t|D(t)=1 )is the survival function for those treated up to t,a n d
S0(t|D(t)=1 )is the counterfactual survival function for this group of indi-
viduals. We take the expectation over the inﬂow distribution of the treated,
ETs|D=1, in order to calculate an average eﬀect. We should emphasize that
t h i sa v e r a g ei sn o te q u a lt ot r e a t m e n to nt h et r e a t e d .
In practical applications the data are almost always right-censored. It is
then appropriate to base the estimates of the eﬀects on the survival function
up to a censoring point (¯ T). Thus, our evaluation focuses on the parameter
∆(t)=S1(t|D(t)=1 )− S0(t|D(t)=1 ) ,t∈ (0,T)
12If the sample is homogenous — both in terms of covariates and the date
of unemployment entry — one option is to calculate the diﬀerence in survival
propensities using a Kaplan-Meier (KM) estimator (or product limit esti-
mator). We apply the KM estimator to estimate S1(t|D(t)=1 )for those
treated at t or earlier. The comparison group of individuals still unemployed
but not treated at t forms the KM estimator of S0(t|D(t)=1 ) .
For an individual who has been treated at ts ≤ t the empirical hazard at










where yi(t)=1if individual i that starts a program in ts ≤ t leaves un-
employment at t and R1(t) is the number of individuals still at risk among
individuals who entered treatment at ts ≤ t. Hence, n1(t)=
PR1(t)
i=1 yi(t) is





Here R0(t) is the set of individuals that has not joined the program at t and
a r ea tr i s ko fb e i n ge m p l o y e di nt; n0(t) is the number of individuals in the
risk set leaving in t. λ(t,D(t)=0 )is an unbiased estimator of the hazard
rate to employment for a randomly chosen individual who have not received
treatment at t.
The potential survival functions conditioning on D(t)=1 ,S j(t|D(t)=1 )




(1 − λ(s,D(s)=j)),t = l,...,T, j =0 ,1
Treatment on the treated for those treated prior to t can then be calculated
as the diﬀerence between the two survival functions, i.e.
b ∆(t)=S(t|D(t)=1 )− S(t|D(t)=0 ) ,t = l,...,T. (18)










13So far we have been silent about controlling for heterogeneity. Now let
us adapt our estimation approach to incorporate this complication. As in-
dicated above, we introduce a matching approach based on the conditional
independence assumption (15).
For treated individuals we simply use the estimator above, i.e., λ(t,D(t)=
1) = n1(t)/R1(t). The problem is ﬁnding a matched comparison group for
individuals treated at t = t. To illustrate the matching procedure let i index
treated individuals and c index individuals in the comparison group.9 We
use one-to-one matching based on propensity scores ω(m), m = i,c.T ot h i s
end we apply a logit maximum likelihood estimator to estimate ω(m).T h e
unique match (for each t)i sf o u n db ym i n i m i z i n gt h ed i s t a n c eb e t w e e nt h e
estimated propensity scores:
cit =a r gm i n
c∈N(t)
|b ω(i) − b ω(c)|, (20)
where b ω(c) is the (N(t)×1) vector of estimated propensity scores at time t.
After ﬁnding a match for a randomly drawn individual i, the process starts
over again until ncs(t) comparable individuals is found in the comparison
sample. Here ncs(t) is the number of individuals on the common support.








where the index cit is deﬁned by (20). With this estimate in hand we have
all the components necessary to calculate (18) adjusted for heterogeneity.
4D a t a
Our empirical analysis is based on the data base LINDA; see Edin and
Fredriksson (2000). LINDA contains a panel of around three percent of
the Swedish population; the data are also cross-sectionally representative.
LINDA is a collection of register data including the income registers, the
censuses, and the unemployment register. The unemployment register begins
in August 1991; the censuses are available every ﬁfth year from 1960 − 90,
while the income registers are available annually starting in 1968. The impor-
tant registers for our purposes are the unemployment and income registers.
The latter register contains very detailed residential information; from this
9Notice that since the treatment indicator is time-varying the set of individuals in the
treated and comparison group changes over time.
14information we can meaningfully construct local labor markets and analyze
mobility between local labor markets.
Using the unemployment registers, we construct a ﬂow sample from the
spells of unemployment and program participation starting during 1993. We
include individuals aged 25 to 50 at the time. Moreover, we exclude individ-
uals suﬀering from a work related handicap and individuals who participated
in a vocational rehabilitation program. Temporary employment, job change,
and part-time unemployment are not considered spells of unemployment,
even though individuals in these states can register at the employment of-
ﬁces.
To these data we match individual earnings, mobility, and unemployment
histories. We trace the sampled individuals back to 1987 for earnings and
mobility, and to August 1991 in the case of unemployment; we also know
whether the individual was in the unemployment register when it started.
We follow the individuals in our sample until the end of 1997. So treat-
ment can, in principle, take place between 1993 and 1997 and analogously
for the outcomes of interest.
The resulting data set has 11,462 individuals. For 400 individuals we lack
information on some of the key characteristics; these individuals are deleted
from the sample.10 This leaves us with 11,062 observations. In the appendix
we provide exact deﬁnitions of the variables used in the analysis; see Table
5. Descriptive statistics are given in Table 1. For variables that are time
varying, this information pertains to the time of registration at the unem-
ployment oﬃce. Notice that, in addition to the mobility, unemployment, and
earnings histories, we have access to information on the economic status of
the household and program activity at the local Public Employment Service
(PES) oﬃce.
Our classiﬁcation of individuals as participants in a job creation program
(JC) or participants in a training program (TP)i sb a s e do nt h eﬁrst program
they participate in after unemployment entry. In the descriptive part of the
analysis, we also use the individuals who never took part in any of these
programs. We refer to this group as non-treated (NT) but note that this
is not a valid comparison group for estimating causal treatment eﬀects for
reasons outlined in section 3. The total sample includes 1,063 (9.6 percent)
individuals who were classiﬁed as TP-participants and 1,857 (16.8 percent)
individuals who were classiﬁed as JC-participants.
We are primarily interested in the time it takes to ﬁnd employment at
home or abroad. An individual is deﬁned as having found employment if
10For 119 individuals we lack information on social assistance receipt and we could not
identify the Public Employment Service (PES) oﬃce handling the individual in 374 cases.
15Table 1: Descriptive statistics
Variable Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max.
JC 0.17 0.37 0.00 1.00
TP 0.10 0.29 0.00 1.00
Employment 0.71 0.45 0.00 1.00
Mobility and employment 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00
Duration (months) 27.76 21.11 1.00 60.00
Female 0.45 0.50 0.00 1.00
Age/10 3.42 0.73 2.50 5.00
Immigrant 0.18 0.38 0.00 1.00
High school education 0.53 0.50 0.00 1.00
University education 0.22 0.41 0.00 1.00
No UI eligibility 0.19 0.39 0.00 1.00
Cash assistance 0.06 0.25 0.00 1.00
Single 0.51 0.50 0.00 1.00
#k i d s> 0 0.43 0.49 0.00 1.00
House owner 0.36 0.48 0.00 1.00
(Household earnings)/105 0.63 0.95 0.00 8.66
Social assistance receipt 0.14 0.34 0.00 1.00
Individual histories
#m o v e sp r i o rt o- 9 3≥ 1 0.18 0.39 0.00 1.00
No unemployment info. 0.40 0.49 0.00 1.00
(Days in open unempl.)/100 0.74 1.09 0.00 5.18
(Days in TP)/100 1.78 6.41 0.00 5.18
(Days in JC)/100 0.53 2.97 0.00 4.44
(Earnings -90)/105 1.09 0.70 0.00 10.18
(Earnings -91)/105 1.12 0.77 0.00 13.49
(Earnings -92)/105 1.04 0.79 0.00 15.22
Local characteristics
Fraction in TP at PES 0.09 0.06 0.00 1.00
Fraction in JC at PES 0.18 0.07 0.00 1.00
# vacancies 0.54 0.67 0.00 2.08
# unemployed 3.43 3.60 0.02 10.64
16(s)he left the register for: employment, temporary employment, and part
time employment.11 However, there is also a substantial amount of attrition
in the unemployment register. It is reasonable to assume that some of this
attrition is due to employment. Indeed, Bring and Carling (2000) show that
the misclassiﬁcation using the register can be severe. In a follow up study of
200 droup-outs they asked the question: “Were you employed (or becoming
employed) at the time of attrition?”. 44.7 percent (of the eﬀective sample of
168 individuals) respondent “yes” to this question. A plausible assumption
is that the classiﬁcation error is larger among the individuals who move.
Therefore, we apply the following strategy in classifying an individual as
employed given that (s)he is a “drop-out”. We begin by calculating the
monthly earnings (starting from the time of classiﬁcation as a drop-out) for
the drop-outs. Then, separately for JC, TP and NT,w ec l a s s i f yt h et o p
44.7 percent in terms of earnings as being employed at the time of being
registered as a drop-out.12
With the deﬁnition of employment in hand, we also know the exact date
when the individual obtained a job from the unemployment register. Notice,
though, that we have no information pertaining to the location of the job
at that point in time. However, there is continuous time information on the
local labor market where the individual resides as long as (s)he is registered at
t h eu n e m p l o y m e n to ﬃce.13 Also, there is information on the residence of an
individual at the end of each year in the income registers. We combine these
two pieces of information with a few assumption in order to create monthly
job and mobility data. The following example describes the procedure; the
principle is that we use the residence information that is closest in time to
the employment event.
Suppose that an individual obtains a job sometime during a year y.I f
this individual returns to the unemployment register before the end of that
year, we classify him as having obtained a job outside the home region if the
PES oﬃce where (s)he registers is located in a diﬀerent local labor market
relative to the original residence according to the unemployment register.
If the individual does not return to the unemployment register, we use the
11We have also used a more generous deﬁnition of employment including the individuals
that remain in the register despite having found employment (remember that an individual
can remain in the register, searching for a new job, despite being, e.g., part-time employed).
Using the more generous deﬁnition does not change the results.
12Notice that we have performed the analysis either treating all “drop-outs” as attrition
or treating all drop-outs as employed. The results are insensitive with respect to these
two alternative classiﬁcations of the drop-outs.
13A local labor market (or travel to work area) is deﬁned on the basis of observed
commuting behavior in the Population Census of 1990. The classiﬁcation we are using
divides Sweden into 111 local labor markets.
17Table 2: Descriptive statistics by treatment status
Variable mean t-ratio
JC TP NT JC/TP JC/NT TP/NT
Employment 0.29 0.30 0.81 -0.14 -45.68 -35.42
Mobility and employment 0.01 0.01 0.03 -0.76 -6.57 -4.11
Duration (months) 46.62 46.67 22.82 -0.09 53.50 43.59
Female 0.54 0.53 0.42 0.72 9.21 6.39
Age/10 3.40 3.44 3.42 -1.44 -1.24 0.70
Immigrant 0.22 0.31 0.15 -4.82 7.25 10.79
High school education 0.55 0.53 0.53 0.72 1.25 0.14
University education 0.18 0.13 0.24 3.37 -5.88 -9.21
No UI eligibility 0.14 0.25 0.20 -7.40 -6.56 3.92
Cash assistance 0.04 0.09 0.07 -4.72 -4.13 2.72
Single 0.52 0.49 0.51 1.90 1.30 -1.21
#k i d s> 0 0.47 0.50 0.42 -1.98 3.85 5.36
House owner 0.30 0.29 0.38 0.60 -6.27 -5.72
(Household earnings)/105 0.57 0.59 0.65 -0.55 -3.48 -2.15
Social assistance receipt 0.18 0.25 0.11 -3.97 7.43 9.88
Individual histories
#m o v e sp r i o rt o- 9 3≥ 1 0.20 0.22 0.18 -1.65 1.84 3.33
No unemployment info. 0.27 0.37 0.44 -5.30 -13.89 -4.24
(Days in open unempl.)/100 1.05 0.82 0.66 4.91 12.36 4.21
(Days in TP)/100 2.67 2.91 1.44 -0.82 6.39 5.99
(Days in JC)/100 1.14 0.51 0.39 4.60 7.04 1.23
(Earnings -90)/105 0.94 0.89 1.16 1.63 -13.66 -11.75
(Earnings -91)/105 0.93 0.92 1.19 0.58 -14.35 -11.33
(Earnings -92)/105 0.82 0.86 1.12 -1.13 -16.39 -10.43
Local characteristics
Fraction in TP at PES 0.09 0.10 0.09 -4.67 3.46 6.76
Fraction in JC at PES 0.19 0.19 0.18 -0.44 2.62 2.54
# vacancies 0.52 0.47 0.55 2.09 -1.94 -4.09
# unemployed 3.30 3.06 3.51 1.90 -2.24 -4.13
# observations 1,857 1,063 8,142
information in the income register pertaining to the end of year y and clas-
sify him analogously if the local labor market diﬀers from the original one
according to the unemployment register. The remainder of the outﬂows to
employment are classiﬁed as being to jobs in the home region.
The strategy outlined above, in principle, yields daily duration data for
unemployment and residence. However, in the empirical analysis we aggre-
gate time to monthly intervals. Descriptive statistics by treatment status are
reported in Table 2.
We note that prior mobility is somewhat greater among those in TP;2 2
percent of those in TP have moved prior to 1993 as compared with 20 and 18
percent for those in JC and NT. Unemployment insurance (UI) eligibility is
18lower for those in TP than those in NT and JC. This is probably related to
t h ef a c tt h a tp r o p o r t i o no fi mmigrants is greatest among TP participants.
There are more females in the programs than in the group of non-treated.
Also, program participants have a longer history of previous unemployment
and program participation. This is especially true for those in JC.T h el a s t
four rows shows that local characteristics are important for treatment status.
For instance, the probability of taking part in a training program is higher
if the individual is registered at a PES oﬃce which has a greater share of its
“clients” in such a program relative to other oﬃces.
The ﬁnal pieces of descriptive facts that we want to show pertains to
employment and employment outside the home region. We ﬁr s tn o t et h a t
contracted mobility is a fairly rare event. Only two percent has made a move
to a job outside the home region. Moreover, exits to employment in general
and contracted mobility are more prevalent among the non-treated. Figures
1 and 2 show that this pattern is true for all durations. However, these may
be a consequence of how we have deﬁned non-treated sample and can neither
be taken as evidence that the programs are not useful in providing work nor
that the programs reduce mobility. In the following section, we will analyze
these eﬀects in more detail.
5T h e e v i d e n c e
This section reports the estimation results. We begin with the discrete choice
regression model. These estimates form the basis for the estimated propensity
scores that we use to adjust for heterogeneity. The next two sections give
estimates of the treatment eﬀects. We focus on three outcomes: the overall
outﬂow to employment, the outﬂow to employment in another region, and
the outﬂow to employment elsewhere given that a job has been found: the
last outcome is our empirical counterpart to search allocation; see eq. (13).
Throughout we report the eﬀe c to ft r e a t m e n tf o rt h o s ew h oh a v eb e e nt r e a t e d
prior to a ﬁxed time point. These parameters are more restricted in scope
than the common treatment of the treated estimand. However, they do have
a causal interpretation given conditional independence.
5.1 The logit regression model
To be as ﬂexible as possible, we run separate logits for each starting point
and each program. Table 3 gives an example of the results from such re-














Figure 1: Diﬀerence in survival rates. Risk: employment. (Dotted lines are
95 % conﬁdence intervals)














Figure 2: Diﬀerence in survival rates. Risk: employment and mobility. (Dot-
ted lines are 95 % conﬁdence intervals)
21Table 3: The probability of entering a program during the ﬁrst month after
unemployment entry
Unconditional Conditional on job
JC TP JC TP
Variable Est. t Est. t Est. t Est. t
Female 0.09 0.53 0.05 0.20 0.14 0.64 0.07 0.23
Age/10 0.55 0.50 -0.12 -0.08 0.24 0.17 3.00 1.47
(Age2/10) -0.05 -0.32 0.05 0.25 -0.03 -0.13 -0.39 -1.40
Immigrant -0.15 -0.68 0.28 1.06 -0.24 -0.74 0.02 0.06
High school ed. 0.00 0.01 -0.09 -0.37 0.03 0.11 0.21 0.67
University ed. -0.29 -1.21 -0.40 -1.26 -0.61 -1.78 0.17 0.45
No UI eligibility -0.67 -2.57 0.77 3.01 -0.47 -1.41 0.34 0.89
Cash assistance -1.59 -2.68 0.53 1.37 -2.05 -2.02 0.86 2.08
Single -0.22 -1.07 0.15 0.52 0.01 0.05 -0.77 -2.21
#k i d s> 0 -0.08 -0.45 0.55 2.14 0.14 0.59 -0.50 -1.55
House owner 0.14 0.84 -0.05 -0.18 0.17 0.82 -0.68 -2.20
(Household earnings)/105 -0.02 -0.09 0.58 2.23 0.15 0.53 0.18 0.47
Social assistance receipt -0.20 -1.69 -0.05 -0.33 -0.14 -0.91 0.03 0.17
#m o v e sp r i o rt o- 9 3> 1 -0.10 -0.51 -0.02 -0.08 -0.26 -0.93 0.33 1.08
No unemployment info. -2.56 -6.00 -2.16 -4.88 -1.97 -4.46 -1.07 -2.91
(Days in open unempl.)/100 0.18 2.75 0.28 3.14 0.23 2.62 0.18 1.38
(Days in TP)/100 0.00 -0.21 0.00 0.16 0.02 1.46 0.00 -0.04
(Days in JC)/100 0.06 5.02 -0.10 -1.88 0.06 2.92 0.02 0.60
(Earnings -90)/105 0.03 0.17 -0.20 -0.82 -0.16 -0.71 -0.27 -0.90
(Earnings -91)/105 0.14 0.93 0.37 1.50 0.40 2.49 0.33 1.11
(Earnings -92)/105 -0.53 -3.21 -0.15 -0.65 -0.44 -2.17 -0.03 -0.09
Fraction in TP at PES -0.02 -1.09 0.07 5.98 -0.02 -0.84 0.07 4.26
Fraction in JC at PES 0.04 4.18 0.01 0.62 0.04 3.03 0.02 1.09
# vacancies 0.05 0.09 -0.02 -0.02 -0.78 -1.02 0.80 1.06
# unemployed -0.10 -1.23 -0.08 -0.65 0.00 0.01 -0.21 -1.54
The models also include dummy variables for region (at the county level) and
registration month at the PES.
gressions (a maximum likelihood estimator is used).14 The results pertain to
the probability of entering a program during the ﬁrst month after unemploy-
ment entry.15 Columns headed “Unconditional” refer to the entire sample,
while columns headed “Conditional on job” refer to a sample restricted to
those ﬁnding employment. We use the latter estimates when analyzing search
allocation.
It is reassuring to see that the unemployment histories and the variables
14Parameter estimates for other entry periods can be obtained from the authors upon
request.
15All local characteristics are time-varying. This is also true for the social assistance
indicator and the earnings of other household members. However, we introduce the latter
two variables lagged once to avoid simultaneity bias.
22measuring the activity at the local oﬃces do a good job in predicting early
program entry. The coeﬃcients suggest, for instance, that individuals who
have long previous spells of open unemployed are more likely to enter pro-
grams. Also there is something of an Ashenfelter dip in the data. The
earnings of program participants are lower in the year preceding unemploy-
ment entry. It seems like the PES oﬃces specialize in providing particular
types of programs. Being registered at oﬃces where the fraction placed in
job creation (training) programs is high increases the individual probability
of entering a job creation (training) program. The other (monthly varying)
local variables have no eﬀect on program participation. The lack of signif-
icance is probably due to the fact that the equations include county ﬁxed
eﬀects.
UI eligibility at the start of the spell is a good predictor of program entry.
Interestingly, the eﬀects are the opposite for the two programs. On the one
hand, being eligible for UI increases the probability of taking part in job
creation programs; on the other hand, it reduces the probability of entering
labor market training. Thus, it seems that training programs are used for
retraining previous workers with obsolete skills to a limited extent.
Estimates such as those in Table 3 form the basis of the matching proce-
dure. When constructing the matched comparison sample, we condition on
the month of unemployment entry, in addition to matching on the estimated
propensity scores. To give a sense about the quality of the matching proce-
dure it is customary to report the absolute standardized bias (ASB)p r ea n d
post matching. Table 4 gives an example. It refers to the characteristics of
JC participants in relation to the comparison group. The ﬁrst column (from
the left) of ASB statistics refer to the standardized diﬀerence in means while
the second shows the standardized diﬀerence for matched pairs. Since there
is a reduction in the ASB statistics matching takes care of some observed
heterogeneity. Of course this will be true for any conditioning set as long as
the characteristics included in that set are related to program participation.
However, we have varied the conditioning set without signiﬁcant reductions
in the median absolute standardized bias (MASB).16
It is perhaps more interesting to investigate if match quality changes by
duration until program entry. This issue is examined in Figure 3, which plots
the MASB at each time point. Match quality is reduced somewhat over the
time period. The variance increases more than the level, however. This is to
16Matching reduces MASBfrom 13.68 to 3.28 for training programs in the unconditional
sample. For JC in the conditional sample there is a reduction from 13.38 to 2.80; for TP
in the conditional sample the reduction is from 14.94 to 7.26. The common support
requirement reduces the sample by: 7.6 % for TP in the unconditional sample; 10.4 % for
JC in the conditional sample; and 12.6 % for TP in the conditional sample.
23Table 4: Bias reduction due to propensity score matching. JC vs. comparison
group, unconditional sample.
Matched sample
JC Comp. JC Comp.
Variable Mean Mean t-ratio ASBa Mean Mean ASBb
Female 0.54 0.43 8.46 21.67 0.54 0.53 1.36
Age/10 3.40 3.43 -1.47 3.76 3.40 3.44 5.29
Immigrant 0.22 0.16 5.83 15.51 0.21 0.22 3.32
High school ed. 0.55 0.54 1.19 3.05 0.54 0.55 0.79
University ed. 0.18 0.23 -4.78 11.86 0.22 0.20 3.36
No UI eligibility 0.14 0.20 -7.17 17.37 0.13 0.13 0.60
Cash assistance 0.04 0.07 -4.78 11.31 0.04 0.05 1.95
Single 0.53 0.50 1.65 4.23 0.53 0.52 2.70
#k i d s> 0 0.46 0.43 2.95 7.56 0.47 0.47 0.00
House owner 0.31 0.37 -5.76 14.49 0.31 0.33 3.93
(Household earnings)/105 0.57 0.65 -3.32 8.23 0.58 0.60 2.93
Social assistance receipt 0.18 0.12 5.85 15.70 0.20 0.20 1.89
#m o v e sp r i o rt o- 9 3≥ 1 0.19 0.18 1.38 3.56 0.19 0.18 1.31
No unemployment info. 0.27 0.42 -13.47 33.17 0.27 0.26 2.05
(Days in open unempl.)/100 1.06 0.68 11.88 32.19 1.06 1.10 3.14
(Days in TP)/100 2.69 1.63 5.48 15.09 2.62 2.87 3.66
(Days in JC)/100 1.15 0.41 6.92 20.42 0.95 1.35 11.02
(Earnings -90)/105 0.94 1.14 -12.23 29.76 0.95 0.97 2.72
(Earnings -91)/105 0.94 1.17 -13.03 31.59 0.95 0.95 0.16
(Earnings -92)/105 0.83 1.10 -15.16 36.58 0.83 0.85 2.49
Fraction in TP at PES 9.06 8.79 1.92 4.87 7.85 7.91 1.02
Fraction in JC at PES 18.58 18.17 2.23 5.70 22.21 22.07 1.90
# vacancies 0.52 0.54 -1.14 2.89 0.88 0.84 5.70
# unemployed 3.30 3.43 -1.46 3.72 3.42 3.39 0.78
# observations 1,857 1,841
MASBc 13.17 2.27






























cMASB = median(ASB), ASB =( ASB(1),...,ASB(rows in table))0
2410 30 50
10 30 50









JC JC (cond on job)
TP  TP (cond on job)
Figure 3: Match quality by duration until program start. (MASB=median
absolute standardized biased. The line is a smoothing spline with 3 df.)
be expected since about three quarters of the training programs starts within
the ﬁrst year of an unemployment spell; see Figure 4. Problems associated
with the apparent reduction in match quality should not be large, since the
MASB is roughly constant for the ﬁrst 12 months for training programs and
for the ﬁrst 24 months for job creation programs (accommodating 90 percent
of the inﬂow into JC).
According to Figure 4, most programs start early on in the unemploy-
ment spell. The estimated treatment eﬀects will mostly reﬂect this fact, i.e.,
programs starting early in the spell will be most inﬂuential in the estimate.
5.2 Employment
The ﬁrst set of causal treatment eﬀects is presented in Figure 5. The out-
come of interest is the outﬂow to employment irrespective of location. The
ﬁgure shows the diﬀerence in survival rates between treated individuals and
matched controls. The upper panel refers to job creation programs and the











Figure 4: Distribution of program starts.
26lower panel to training programs. The dotted lines in the ﬁgures are conﬁ-
dence intervals.17












Figure 5: Causal treatment eﬀects. Diﬀerence in survival rates. Risk: em-
ployment. (Dotted lines are 95 % conﬁdence intervals)
The estimates suggest that participation in a job creation program re-
duces the cumulative outﬂow to employment by 29 percentage points. The
corresponding number for training programs is a reduction by 26 percentage
points. Relative to the cumulative outﬂow in the two comparison groups
(0.73 for the JC comparison group and 0.68 for the TP comparison group)
these estimates are remarkably similar. The relative decline associated with
JC participation is 40 percent, while the decline associated with TP partic-
ipation amounts to 39 percent. Thus, the size of the estimates have to be
17The conﬁdence intervals are calculated as ±2
p
VarS(t|D(t)=1 )+VarS(t|D(t)=0 ) ,
where VarS(s|D(t)=1 )is calculated according to equation (19).
27considered large. But notice that they are only about three quarters of the
size suggested by the naive comparisons in Figure 1.
T h es l o p eo ft h et w oc u r v e si m p l i e st h a tt h et w op r o g r a m sh a v ea ne f -
fect on the job hazard mainly during the ﬁrst two years after program entry.
This may indicate that active search is vital in the initial period after unem-
ployment entry. A somewhat speculative interpretation is that the programs
fail because they reduce search activity initially which, in turn, impedes a
successful reentry on the regular market.
From a relative comparison of the two programs by duration it appears
that job creation programs are plagued by direct locking-in eﬀects to a greater
extent that training programs. The negative eﬀe c to nt h ej o bh a z a r di s
immediately visible in the graph pertaining to JC;f o rTP,h o w e v e r ,t h e r ei s
literally no eﬀect during the ﬁrst three months.
As we have emphasized repeatedly, the evidence presented in Figure 5
represent causal eﬀects for those treated prior to a certain time point. The
wider question is whether we can infer something about treatment on the
treated as conventionally deﬁned. If the treatment eﬀects are of equal sign at
all durations, then the analysis in Fredriksson and Johansson (2003) suggests
that the long run eﬀect (at T =6 0 ) in Figure 5 is lower in absolute size than
the conventional eﬀect of treatment on the treated.
5.3 Mobility
Now, let us turn to the program eﬀects on contracted mobility. Figure 6
shows the diﬀerences in survival rates when the risk is employment outside
the home region. In the longer run, both programs reduce the outﬂow to
employment elsewhere. The cumulative outﬂow is reduced by 3.2 percentage
points for job creation programs and by 2.6 points for training programs.
Relative to cumulative contracted mobility in the comparison groups (0.049
for the JC comparison group and 0.044 for the TP comparison group) these
estimates imply a reduction of 67 and 59 percent for JC and TP respectively.
Again the shape of the graphs are fairly similar for the two programs.
There is one diﬀerence though: the eﬀect on the contracted mobility hazard
seems to disappear after 1.5 years in the case of training programs; this is
not the case for job creation programs. Thus job creation programs appear
to be plagued by negative long run eﬀects to a greater extent than training
programs. (An analogous pattern is visible in Figure 5). Having said this, we
should emphasize that there are no statistical diﬀerences (at the 5 % level)
between the two programs.
The evidence thus suggests that the programs reduce contracted mobil-
ity. Can we say anything about the mechanisms delivering this result? In














Figure 6: Causal treatment eﬀects. Diﬀerence in survival rates. Risk: em-
ployment and mobility. (Dotted lines are 95 % conﬁdence intervals)
the analytical framework of section 2 we assumed that the program eﬀects
may work along two dimensions: it may change the overall job ﬁnding prob-
ability and there may be a home bias in search allocation because program
participation implies more contacts with local PES oﬃcers. So, is the result
in Figure 6 due to the fact that programs reduce employment prospects in
general or is it due to participants allocating less search outside the home
region. Figure 7 presents some evidence pertaining to this issue. It presents
diﬀerences in survival rates for the sub-sample who got a job. The risk,
again, is employment outside the home region. The evidence suggests that
t h e r ei sa ne q u a l - s i z e dr e d u c t i o ni no u t ﬂows to jobs at home and outside the
home region after taking part in either a job creation or training program.
Thus, the evidence does not suggest that there is a home bias associated
with program participation. Program participation reduces the outﬂow to
29jobs outside the home region because it lowers the overall contact frequency.


















Figure 7: Causal treatment eﬀects. Diﬀerence in survival rates. Risk: em-
ployment and mobility conditional on job. (Dotted lines are 95 % conﬁdence
intervals)
Another interesting issue related to our analytical framework is whether
we can characterize the selection into programs. Ostensibly one can get at the
answer by comparing, e.g., Figures 2 and 6. However, this is not right since
Figure 6 features propensity adjustment and ad i ﬀerent comparison popu-
lation. The simplest way to characterize the selection into programs is to
calculate a propensity-adjusted version of Figure 2.18 Propensity adjustment
reduces the long-run decline in contracted mobility from 3.4 to 3.2 percent-
age points for JC and from 3.2 to 2.5 percentage points for TP.T a k i n gt h e
analytical framework literally, this suggests that less mobile individuals are
18This graph is available upon request.
30more likely to enter labor market programs. But the more general interpre-
tation is that the probability of entering a program is higher for the least
employable (in the observed sense).
6C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we have analyzed whether participation in active labor market
programs improve employment prospects and increase mobility in the longer
run. We have conducted the analysis using unique micro data with, at least
to some extent, novel estimation techniques.
The answers to the above questions turn out to be negative. Moreover,
the picture is even more dismal than that. Participation in either of the two
prototype programs — job creation and training programs — reduces the long-
run probability of ﬁnding employment, irrespective of where it is located.
These negative eﬀects must be considered substantial on any metric. Rela-
tive to the overall outﬂow to employment in the comparison group, program
participation reduces the outﬂow to employment by around 40 percent. The
bulk of this eﬀect occurs during the ﬁrst two years after program entry.
With respect to geographical mobility, we ﬁnd that both programs reduce
the outﬂow to jobs outside the home region. Relatively speaking this eﬀect is
greater than the reduction of the outﬂow to employment in general. Still, the
decline in contracted mobility appears to be driven by the fact that program
participation reduce employment prospects in general. We ﬁnd no evidence
suggesting that labor market programs change the allocation of search across
regions.
T h en e g a t i v ee ﬀects of program participation on the overall outﬂow to
employment are consistent with recent results pertaining to the eﬀects of
program participation in Sweden; see the extensive review in Calmfors et
al. (2002). Larsson (2000), for instance, ﬁnds that training programs reduce
employment and earnings for youths substantially. Moreover, Regnér (1997)
concludes that the return to participation in training programs is in most
cases negative.
The time period we are considering was a rather extreme period on the
Swedish labor market. Unemployment rose dramatically over just a few
years in the beginning of the 1990s. Concomitantly, program activity rose
to unprecedented levels. Our results contributes to the weight of evidence
suggesting that active labor market programs were not well-functioning at
the time.
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Appendix: More details on sampling
Our basic strategy when sampling spells was to consider all new spells start-
ing in 1993. We restricted the data by excluding individuals who participated
in a vocational rehabilitation program or were classiﬁed as having a work re-
lated handicap in any period from the start of the unemployment register.
During a spell in the unemployment register, individuals are classiﬁed as
belonging search categories (cat). With this information we excluded spells
that we did not consider to be a spell of unemployment in the usual sense (i.e.
that the individual is searching full time and can take a job immediately).
On the basis on this consideration we excluded those who were part-time
unemployed (cat =2 1 ), temporarily employed (cat =3 1 ), and on-the-job
searchers (cat =4 1 ) during their entire spell in the register.19
19For completeness we report the code which identiﬁes these categories, although they
may not have much meaning to the reader.
33Individuals who were classiﬁed as being diﬃcult/impossible to help ﬁnd
a job or a slot in an active labor market program, ALMP, (cat =1 4or
cat =9 1 ) during their entire spell have been deleted.
A period of part-time unemployment (cat =2 1 ), temporary employment
(cat =3 1 ), and on-the-job search (cat =4 1 )e n d e dt h es p e l li ft h ep e r i o d
lasted more than seven days.
If the individual started a spell with being classiﬁed as diﬃcult/impossible
to “place” in a job or an ALMP (cat =1 4or cat =9 1 ) we deleted this initial
period (i.e. the spell started when the individual moved to another state).
The logic for doing this is that getting this classiﬁcation initially and then
moving to another search category often indicates that the individual is about
to ﬁnish their education.
We also made a consistency check on the data. For each individual, the
spell data were sorted by start date and end date. If the start date of a search
category was prior to the previous end date, the observation was given the
previous end date as a starting date. If the spell (so generated) implied a
negative duration the observation was deleted. Also, spells with negative
dates were deleted.
All in all, these transformations and exclusions resulted in the data con-
taining 11,462 individuals starting their unemployment spell in 1993.




Immigrant =1 if born outside Sweden
High school education =1 if attained upper secondary school
University education =1 if undergraduate or postgraduate education
No UI eligibility =1 if not eligible for UI or Cash assistance at start of spell
Cash assistance =1 if eligible for Cash assistance at start of spell
Single =1 if not married nor cohabiting
#k i d s> 0 =1 if at least one kid < 18 years of age
House owner =1 if owning a house
Household earnings the earnings of other household members
Social assistance receipt =1 if member of social assistance receiving household
#m o v e sp r i o rt o- 9 3≥ 1 =1 if at least one move prior to 1993
No unemployment info. =1 if not in unempl. register 1 Aug. 1991 — 31 Dec. 1992
Days in open unempl. days in open unemployment 1 Aug. 1991 — 31 Dec. 1992
Days in TP days in training program 1 Aug. 1991 — 31 Dec. 1992
Days in JC days in job creation program 1 Aug. 1991 — 31 Dec. 1992
Earnings -90 individual earnings in 1990
Earnings -91 individual earnings in 1991
Earnings -92 individual earnings in 1992
Fraction in TP at PES share of unempl. in training programs at the local PES
Fraction in JC at PES share of unempl. in job creation programs at the local PES
# vacancies number of vacancies in the local labor market
# unemployed number of unemployed in the local labor market
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